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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the interaction
of socio-economic and political variables that have
contributed to Argentina's instability using Samuel P.
Huntington's theory of political institutionalization.
This analysis outlines the destabilizing patterns
emerging from the Radical and Peronist periods in Argentine
history and considers the implications of these processes
for the current government of President Radi Alfonsin.
The degree of political instability linked with the
mass movements during these two periods appears to be
positively associated with: electoral strategies using
populistic appeals to the mobilized masses, the informal
and personalistic character of the state, and the lack of
widespread acceptance of a single set of political rules
to govern behavior.
The results of this study point to the relevance of
Huntington's concept of political decay for explaining the
chronic instability plaguing Argentina. It is suggested
that the most important task confronting President Alfonsin
is the establishment of adaptable, complex, autonomous, and
legitimate political institutions and practices*

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL
DECAY IN ARGENTINA

h

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the impact of modernization on
Argentina's political processes. Specifically, it is a study
of the factors which have contributed to Argentina's political
instability.

One school of thought argues that rapid socio

economic transformation created pressures which by their
intensity simply overwhelmed the political system. According
to this view, large-scale immigration, sudden economic growth,
urbanization, and the onslaught of industrialization gave rise
to social forces which have been locked in a continuous
1

struggle with each other for power.
Another school of thought stresses the importance of the
political system's institutional capacity.
view, politics failed.

According to this

The actions of political leaders and

institutions in meeting certain crises led to the demise of
2
the system. To understand Argentina’s climate of instability,
it is therefore necessary to study the sources of political
weakness•
The central questions to be answered in this thesis focus
on the relationship between rapid social change and the
political processes in Argentina.

One important area of

investigation is the impact of new social groups dh the
Argentine political process.

Another deals with the
2

.

3.
political institutions themselves:

how much did they

contribute to their own demise?
To reach some conclusions about these matters, it is
necessary to understand how the interaction of socio-economic
forces and political structures can produce instability.

The

first chapter provides a theoretical framework that explains
how and why social mobilization, economic development, and the
strength of political institutions affect the level of
instability in a given country.

The second chapter applies

this approach to the Radical period in Argentine politics.
The third chapter examines the Peronist period from the same
perspective.

The fourth chapter then suggests some

implications, based on this analysis, for the current
administration of President Radi Alfonsin. Finally, the
conclusion highlights the destabilizing processes that have
contributed to Argentina's political instability.

//

NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

1
See: Gino Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de
transicion (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1962).
2

Peter H. Smith, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy:
Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955 (Madison,
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 89.

CHAPTER I

THEORY AND PROPOSITIONS
This chapter seeks to explain how social mobilization,
economic development, and the strength of political
institutions affect the level of political stability
in Argentina.
clarified.

First, the concepts are defined and

Second, the relationships between these

independent variables and political stability are examined.
I•

Independent Variables

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
Karl Deutsch defines social mobilization as:
The process in which major clusters of old social,
economic, and psychological commitments are eroded
or broken and people become available for new
patterns of socialization of behavior.
This is what occurs to a large number of people in areas
undergoing modernization.

Deutsch suggests that social

mobilization can be measured according to the percentage of
the population:
(1) that is exposed to important aspects of
modern life,
(2) that is exposed to mass media,
(3) that has changed its residence location,
5.

(4) that is living in towns (or cities of
a certain size),
(5) that is employed in non-agricultural
occupations,
(6) that is literate, and
(7) by conges in the per capita gross national
product.
According to Deutsch, a "threshold of criticality" is
attained when these social factors begin to produce changes
3
in the social structure.
One of the most important analyses of the implications
of social mobilization with regard to Latin America is Gino
Germani's study of Argentine society.

Following Deutsch,

Germani defines social mobilization as the psychosocial
process in which passive, traditional groups acquire their
own norms and aspirations separate from those established by
4
the previous rules. This analysis of social transition
highlights the resulting increase or change in the nature of
political participation.

Germani posits that high levels of

social mobilization lead to increased levels of participation.
The political pressures are greatest after social mobilization
reaches a threshold of significance, but before the political
structures adjust to the new demands.

In sum, when mobilized

groups become aware of new needs, and traditional political
structures are unwilling or unable to process rising demands,
instability often results.
Anne L. and Peter R. Schneider argue that high rates of
change in social mobilization may not have a significant
correlation with political instability.

Their data

7.

concerning ten West European nations indicate that, the
social mobilization process is significant, but its
importance is due to "its relationship with economic
development and institutionalization and not because of any
5
direct impact on political disorder." The Schneiders
conclude that political instability is more likely to occur
when social mobilization takes place faster than
institutionalization or when social mobilization
outruns economic development.

Thus, for a fuller

understanding of the relative importance of social
mobilization, these authors recommend an approach that
distinguishes between rates of change for different
variables.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Economic development refers to the productive capacity
of a nation.

Higher levels of economic development have

traditionally been associated with a moderate degree of
societal tensions.

Seymour M. Lipset and others argue that,

as economic development increases, democracy increases and so
6
does political stability. In their study of political
instability, Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett find
evidence to support Lipset's claim.

They point out that

both an increase in the level of per capita income and a rise
7
in the growth rate are associated with domestic stability.
This view fails to take into account how economic
//
development may cause disruptions in the social system.
In his study of the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville

argued that real economic conditions improved slightly before
the revolution.

In response to these improved conditions,

the nobility, already weakened by the third estate's growth
in economic power, attempted to retain its medieval
privileges.

The ensuing "feudal reaction" led to revolution

as "the French found their position the more unsupportable
8
in proportion to its improvement."
James C. Davies combines de Tocqueville's idea of
frustrated expectations in a period of improving economic
conditions with Marx's notion of misery associated with
economic decline to build a theory of revolution.

He argues

that:
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a
prolonged period of objective economic and
social development is followed by a short
period of sharp reversal. . . The crucial
factor is the vague or specific fear that
ground gained over a long period of time will
be quickly lost.°
According to this perspective, economic and social progress
is usually a necessary condition for violent political change.
In order to assess the extent of societal frustration
within this framework, it is useful to examine the
distribution of income.

Changes in income distribution may

be unrelated to overall growth or decline of GNP.

Even in an

expanding economy, for the majority, economic development may
still be a zero-sum game.

Shifts in income distribution that

represent an improvement for one group may be seen as a
decline by other groups.

Therefore, economic satisfactions or

dissatisfactions may become political variables.
Bruce M. Russett, in "Inequality and Instability:

The

Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," operationalized
instability by aggregating across nation units the number of
10
violent political deaths occurring between 1950-1962.
He assessed the degree of the inequitable distribution of
land for each of these nation units with a measure of the
11

total inequality of a distribution known as the Gini Index.
The Gini Index calculates over the whole population, the
difference between an "ideal" cumulative distribution of
land and the actual distribution.
the greater the inequality.

The higher the Gini Index,

In his correlational analysis,

Bruce Russett illustrated the positive association between
inequality and instability.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson define political
participation as "behavior influencing or attempting to
12
influence the distribution of public goods."
This definition
rests on the notion of collective and public goods.

According

to the writers, collective goods consist of "goods that when
supplied to one member of a collectivity cannot easily be
13
denied to others of the same group."
Here, public goods
refers to a collective goods provided by governments through
governmental expenditure.

Streets, national security, and

monetary systems provide examples of public goods.
A further example of the application of this definition
in Latin American societies will more fully illustrate its
//
implications. The stability of a regime in power is a public
good to certain citizens since stable government can ensure

10.

particular economic, social, or political arrangements
beneficial to certain sectors of society.

Thus, showing

political support through attending pro-government rallies
or voting in elections constitutes participation.

Similarly,

such acts as casting an invalid ballot in an election (a form
of protest) or engaging in an anti-regime movement, rally,
strike, or riot are also participation.

Such actions attempt

to influence the public good through either collective support
14
or opposition.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Samuel P. Huntington argues that the stability of a
modernizing political system depends on the strength of its
political organizations and procedures.

The strength of

political institutions depends on their level of institution
alization and their scope of support.

Institutionalization

is "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire
value and stability," and scope of support refers to "the
extent to which the political organizations and procedures
15
encompass activity in the society."
The level of institutionalization of any political system
can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, coherence, and
16
autonomy of its organizations and procedures.
If development
occurs, then so does regression. Institutions decay and lose
their effectiveness as they become more rigid, simple,
17
disorganized, and subordinate.
^
1.

ADAPTABILITY-RIGIDITY
The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the

11.

more highly institutionalized it is; the more rigid it is, the
18
lower its level of institutionalization.
Adaptability is a
function of environmental challenge and age. As environments
change with time, they offer new challenges to organizations.
As Huntington points out, success in adapting to one
environmental challenge strengthens an institution's capacity
19
to deal with subsequent challenges.
For example, the
strength of a party is reflected in its ability to survive its
founder or the charismatic leader who first brings it to
power.

Adaptability refers to a political system's ability to

meet challenges and survive.
2.

COMPLEXITY—SIMPLICITY

The more complicated an organization is, the more highly
20
institutionalized it is.
Complexity involves the
establishment of organizational sub-units both hierarchically
and functionally.

The greater the number and variety of

the sub-units the greater the ability of the system to
21
maintain the support of its members.
For instance, parties
in modernizing societies need supporting organizational links
in order to develop mass appeals. Linkages between the party
and socio-economic organizations such as labor unions are
22
particularly valuable.
Relatively simple political systems
and institutions without supporting organizational links, on
the other hand, are usually over-whelmed in the modernization
process.

The simplest political system is that which depends

on one individual; it is also the least stable.
/

3. COHERENCE-DISUNITY
The more unified and coherent an organization is, the

more highly institutionalized it is.
An effective organization requires, at a minimum,
substantial consensus on the functional boundaries
of the group and or the procedures for resolving
disputes which come up within those boundaries. ^
This capacity for coordination and discipline is essential in
I
the field of politics. As an organization or procedure
produces a sense of group identity and morale, it increases
in coherence.

The greater the disunity of an organization
24
or system, the lower its level of institutionalization.
4.

AUTONOMY-SUBORDINATION
A final indicator of institutionalization is autonomy, or

the extent to which political organizations exist
independently of other social groupings.

Huntington argues

that, in a highly developed political system, organizations
are "insulated" from the direct influence of nonpolitical
25
groups and procedures.
Institutions are autonomous to the
extent that they have interests and values independent from
other institutions and social forces.

Political systems

containing organizations and procedures that are subordinate
to the interests of one group are less likely to withstand
the pressures of modernization.
LEGITIMACY
In the political arena, trust in institutions rests on a
cultural foundation in which ideals and expectations and
26
institutional practices are mutually reinforcing.
When
beliefs are widely shared, institutions are better''equipped
to deal with the tensions of group conflict. As a gap develops

13.

between the beliefs in a society and government practices,
doubt in the effectiveness of authority increases, and the
political system loses its capacity to mobilize consent and
to respond effectively to basic problems.
In an often quoted definition of legitimacy, Seymour M.
Lipset states:
Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system
to engender and maintain the belief that the
existing political institutions are the most
appropriate ones for the society. '
Here, legitimacy is both affective and evaluative.
to Lipset,

According

"Groups will regard a political system as

legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its
28
values fit in with their primary values."
According to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, when the
frequency of affective and evaluative orientations toward the
political structure are high, the congruence between culture
and structure promotes high levels of allegiance, or
legitimacy.

This cultural approach suggests that, as

political systems move toward "allegiant" orientations, they
tend to become more stable; when the frequency of positive
feeling and attitudes approaches indifference, instability
is likely to result.

As Almond and Verba point out:

Long-run political stability may be more
dependent on a more diffuse sense of attachment
or loyalty to the political system — a loyalty
not based specifically on system performance . ™
In Argentina populist impulses challenged the legitimacy
of the traditional norms and practices in society.

n

According

to Jose Luis Romero, the modernization process in Argentina
spawned new, popular, and democratic attitudes among the

14.

masses that, in part, coincided with the ideals of the
established elites and, in part, conflicted with them. As he
points out, “Two antagonistic political lines were drawn, and
their conflict had repercussions on the stability of the
30
institutional system."
This conflict of modern values with
traditionalism is thus the basis for Argentina's continuing
crises of legitimacy.
II.

Dependent Variables

POLITICAL STABILITY
Contemporary studies carry varied labels for political
stability:

political order, integration, nation-building,

homeostatic equilibrium, government performance, etc.

A

consensus exists among those who use these terms that
societies may differ in the degree in which their members
cooperate together in collective action.

According to Charles

Tilly, collective action consists of people acting together
31
in pursuit of common interests.
In its ideal form, the
stable polity would be able to make collective decisions and
32
have them obeyed without the application of coercion.
Although stability implies a lack of change, societies
must move forward in order to meet changing circumstances.
Developmental change is gradual and orderly.
evolving —

hence remains stable —

A polity is

if changes are taking

place in the direction of increased harmony among its
33
components.
Such change results from regularized^contests
for power and from continued incremental adjustments in the
allocation of benefits.

15.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY
A polity is unstable if it neither develops toward
increased social cohesion nor functions according to
precepts widely shared by society.

Political instability

in its most extreme form leads to violence.

The sources of

political violence can be collective as well as elitist.

Mass

violence is a manifestation of social disintegration directed
in opposition to the society or to parts of it.
collective violence include;

Instances of

rebellions and riots,

assassinations of public officials, guerrilla warfare,
bombings and terrorist acts, and other armed attacks.
In general, Charles Tilly defines collective violence as any
interaction that leads to the seizure or damage of persons
34
or objects, so long as resistance occurs.
Elite violence is often related to mass violence.

Elite

repression may precede or follow collective violence? and
elite coups d'etat may also be associated with the occurence
of violent collective action.

According to D.A. Hibbs Jr.,

elite repression consists of "actions taken by political
authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived
threat to the security and stability of the government, the
35
regime, or the state itself."
Coups, on the other hand, are
illegal attempts to overthrow the government by a particular
segment of the population, coalitions and factions of
disaffected individuals within the administration or ruling
36
party, and (commonly in Latin America) the militar^.

16.

III.

Toward a Framework for Analysis

HUNTINGTON'S SYNTHESIS
Samuel P. Huntington provides one of the most balanced
development theories dealing with questions of political
stability.

In Political Order in Changing Societies# he

argues that the domestic violence and instability of the
1950s and the 1960s, "was in large part the product of rapid
social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into
politics, coupled with the slow development of political
37
institutions."
His theory is appealing in its examination
of three factors —

rapid social change, mobilization, and

political institutionalization.
For Huntington, the focus of political change is the
interaction between rapid mobilization and
institutionalization.

The impact of modernization on

political stability is determined by the relationships
between social mobilization and economic development, social
frustration and non-political mobility opportunities, and
political participation and political institutionalization.
Huntington expresses these relationships in a series of
38
ratios:
(1) Social mobilization
■Economic development

—

(2) Social frustration
Mobility opportunities
(3) Political participation
Institutionalization

—

Social frustration
Political participation
^ Political instability

,f

Huntington thus integrates elements of both the socio-

17.

economic and the political systems into a single framework
seeking to explain how political instability occurs.
Keeping these two broad areas of concentration in mind,
his general theory can be simplified into two ratios:
(1) Social mobilization
Satisfaction

—

(2) Political participation
Institutionalization

Political participation
^ Political instability

The processes expressed by these ratios read as follows:

To

the extent that demands generated by social mobilization are
not satisfied in the socio-economic realm, they will generate
political participation or demands placed on the political
system.

If the system is sufficiently institutionalized to

handle these demands, order will be maintained.

If demands

exceed the system's management capacity, instability will
result.
MODIFYING HUNTINGTON'S THEORY
In his study testing the theory's relevance to Latin
America, J. Mark Ruhl questions Huntington's assumption that
higher economic development produces satisfaction.

As he

points out, "The economic development level may be less
important than the degree to which economic benefits are
39
distributed equally."
Taking this point into account, a
revised version of Huntington's theory might introduce an
alternative measure of socio-economic satisfaction, labeled
"distribution."

The modified theory would read:

political

b
participation demands are created to the extent that social
mobilization pressures are not diffused by more equitable

18.

income distribution.
Huntington's operationalization of political
institutionalization must also be revised to describe with
precision the political institutions most "appropriate"
for handling the socio-cultural changes occurring in
Argentine society.

A strong or appropriate political system

would be characterized by:
(1) ADAPTABILITY (flexibility to articulate
and aggregate new demands),
(2) COMPLEXITY (institutional linkages to
socio-economic groups and organizations),
(3) AUTONOMY (independent structure of
national government), and
(4) LEGITIMACY (as perceived by society).

In constructing this index of institutionalization, one
of Huntington's indicators (coherence) is dropped from
consideration because of problems in operationalizing the
concept with respect to Argentina's political development.
The coherence of political institutions might be estimated by
determining the percentage of positions in the Senate held
by the majority party, the total of different parties
represented in the Senate, the number of parties in the
Chamber of Deputies, and the percentage of seats held by the
largest party.

Nations scoring high on coherence are usually

those in which a smaller number of parties hold stronger
40
control of the upper and lower legislative bodies.
However,
Argentina during the Radical and Peronist periods under
consideration in this study moved politically toward becoming
a one-party state.

Consequently, the extremely high scores on

19

.

coherence during these periods would result in a distortion of
the relationship between this indicator and the other
indicators of institutionalization.
The index of institutionalization involves four separate
factors:

the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and

legitimacy of political institutions.

Following Huntington,

an important aspect of adaptability is the percentage of the
vote gained by "surge" parties —

parties which appear

suddenly and appeal to a particular group or have rather
41
specific or limited issue appeals.
An adaptable party
system should be able to aggregate the interests represented
by these surge parties, thus inhibiting their appearance.
Complexity of government is the second indicator on the
institutionalization index.

The extent of decentralization

of government in the society is used to estimate complexity.
This measure represents a comprehensive governmental structure
which provides citizens with more possibilities for inputs.
The extent of decentralization is estimated by examining the
strength of linkages between the central government and
important groups and organizations in society.
Autonomy is estimated by examining the independence of
national government institutions from control by outside
organizations or groups.

Additionally, this indicator

measures the ability of these structures to guide and direct
members of society rather than their being manipulated by
powerful individuals.

An organization that is sufficiently

>!
autonomous to orient the roles of its members will have a life
of its own greater than the sum of its parts; it will be

42
institutionalized.
Legitmacy is estimated by using Robert Dahl's concept of
43
opposition.
Opposition to the structure of government,
rather than to policies or personnel, is considered to
represent the perception that the structures are not
legitimate.

The mobilization of groups and parties which

oppose the system is used to indicate the onset of a crisis
of legitimacy.
By adding these elements to the theory, the equations
would read:
(1) Social mobilization
Distribution
(2) Participation
Institutionalization

Participation
_

Instability

The process expressed by these relationships would translate
as :

To the extent that demands generated by social

mobilization are not satisfied by the distribution of
economic benefits, they will stimulate political
participation.

If adaptable, complex, autonomous, and

legitimate institutions exist, order will be maintained.
As institutions become more rigid, simple, subordinate, and
people no longer value or utilize them, instability is likely
to result.
SOME PROPOSITIONS
The relationships presented in this revised version
of Huntington's theory provide a basis for generating
propositions about political instability in Argentina.

21.

However, a major problem with this approach is its lack
of any precise definitions for political instability.
Huntington chooses instead to treat terms like "instability"
and "violence" in summary fashion without specifying what
these terms entail.

As Charles Tilly points outs

To accept the Huntington theory confidently,
one would also want clear distinctions among
radicalism, instability, violence, extent of
protest, and propensity to revolution not to
mention a specification of their relationships
to each other. 44
Huntington never clears this difficulty.
Taking into account this caveat concerning Huntington's
theory, it is necessary to designate the forms of instability
that may result from the interaction of the main variables.
This analysis of instability in Argentina will make
distinctions about political instability based on the
discussion of dependent variables earlier in this chapter.
Political violence can be collective as well as elitist.
Drawing from these modifications to Huntington's theory,
this study considers the following propositions:
(1) Rapid economic development unevenly distributed,
accompanied by high levels of social mobilization,
led to the participation of new groups in Argentine
politics.
(2) The participation of new groups in politics
coupled with the decay of institutions led to
outbreaks of elite violence.
In order to evaluate these propositions, it is
necessary to set forth a framework for analysis to apply to
the two periods of major social and political upheaval in
modern Argentine history.

To facilitate this examination of

the interaction of independent variables during each period,

22.

this framework places developments in the socio-economic
realm (economic distribution and social mobilization),
under the heading of "Operational Environment."

Developments

in the political arena (adaptability, complexity, autonomy,
and legitimacy), are grouped as part of the "Institutional
Environment."

This focus on the roles and relationships of

the developmental variables should help identify the major
forces contributing to Argentina's political instability.

/

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1
Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development,” American Political Science Review 55
(September 1961): 494-95.
2

Ibid., p. 496.
3
Ibid.
4
Gino Germani, Polftica v sociedad en una epoca de
transici6n (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1962), p. 151.
5
Anne L. & Peter R. Schneider, "Social Mobilization,
Political Institutions, and Political Violence: A Cross
National Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 4 (April
1971): 88.
6
Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, expanded ed.,
Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), pp. 31-34.
7
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett,
"Correlations among Political and Social Indices,"
in Russett, et al. World Handbook of Political and
Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964), p. 272.
8
As quoted in: Gilbert W. Merkx, "Recessions and
Rebellions in Argentina, 1870-1970," Hispanic American
Historical Review 53 (May 1973): 286.
9
James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution,"
American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962): 5-6, 8.

10
Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The
Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics
16 (April 1964): 442-454.
11

Gini Index of Inequality in Bruce M. Russett, et al.,
World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New
York: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 239-240.
12

John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds.. Political
Participation in Latin America, Vol. 1, (New York: Holmes
& Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 6.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., p. 7.
15
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
p. 12.

16
Ibid.
17
Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political
Decay," World Politics 17 (April 1965): 392-393.
18
Huntington, Political Order, p. 13.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., p. 17.
21
Ibid., p. 18.

22
Huntington, Political Order, p. 410.
23
Ibid., p. 22.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., p. 20.
26
Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise
of Disharmony (Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 12.
27
Lipset, Political Man, p. 64.
28
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Developement and Political Legitimacy," American Political
Science Review 53 (March 1959): 86-87.
29
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 246.
30
Jose Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political
Thought, trans. Thomas F. McGann, (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 166.
31
Charles Tilly, From Modernization to Revolution (Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978), p. 7.
32
Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, Violence and
Repression in Latin America: A Quantitative and Historical
Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 14.*

33
Martin C. Needier, Political Development in Latin America:
Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York:
Random House, 1968), p. 20.
34
Tilly, p. 176.
35
D. A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence: A CrossNational Causal Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc, 1973), pp. 88-89.
36
Ibid., p. 93.
37
Huntington, Political Order, p. 4.
38
Ibid., p. 55.
39
Mark J. Ruhl, "Social Mobilization and Political
Instability in Latin America: A Test of Huntington's
Theory," Inter-American Economic Affairs 29(Autumn 1975):
6.
40
Schneider, p. 76.
41
Ibid.
42
Duff and McCamant, pp. 96-97.
43
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-16.

***

/,
Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?"
Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973): 433.

CHAPTER II

THE RADICAL PERIOD, 1916 - 1930
In an effort to explain the failure of Argentina's
experiment with democracy during the Radical period, this
chapter considers, first, the socio-economic underpinnings
of the Argentine political system and, second, the system's
internal or structural characteristics that have contributed
to instability.
I.

Operational Environment
From the seventeenth until the late nineteenth century,

livestock provided the main products and exports of the
Pampas region.

The economy developed from the hunting of

wild cattle and horses for their hides (1600-1750), to the
formation of larger herds of semi-tamed animals (1700-1850),
to the production of fats and salted meat (1800-1890), and
1
finally to sheep raising (1830-1900). At each stage, James R.
Scobie observes, the rift between the interior and the coast
widened, until the coast achieved dominance.
As developed in the coastal region during the late
nineteenth century, the rural economy prospered under an
extensive land tenure system.

The acquisition and'7

maintenance of land required financial resources and political
27.

28.

influence.

Wealthy merchants developed the estancias or

cattle ranches in the eighteenth century.

These owners

generally obtained land for prestige and income but left
2
the administration and labor to foremen and gauchos.
With the establishment of the saladero, or meat-salting
plant, in Buenos Aires and at ports along the Uruguay and
Parana rivers, the landowning and cattle interests of the
coast began to consolidate their wealth and position through
3
world trade. In the decade following 1810, the revenues from
the export of hides tripled.

The introduction of the saladero

increased the yearly slaughter of cattle for salted meat from
7,000 head in the 1790s, to 60,000 in 1822, and to 350,000 by
4
1827. To reinforce their prestige and power, those benefiting
from these developments advocated:
. . . further expansion of large landholdings;
rejection of immigrants, crops, livestock, or any
variation from the formula of animals and land;
access to and control of ports and commerce;
creation of rural peons from the vagabond gaucho
element; jmd subordination of government to its
control. *
Juan Manuel de Rosas became the leading proponent of
this cattle civilization.

After becoming governor of

Buenos Aires in 1835, he contributed to the estancia-saladero
interests with a massive land give-away program.

The military

received large grants for service in the Indian wars,
holders of public bonds took over large areas, and sales
6
favored political supporters. These policies made the coast
a land of ports, —estancias, and animals, while increasingly
alienating the economic interests of the interior.
With the fall of Rosas in 1852, the economy shifted away

from the estancias and saladeros toward sheep raising.

Wool

exports rose from an average of 6,000 tons annually in the
1840s to 11,000 in the 1850s, 50,000 in the 1860s, 80,000 in
the 1870s, and 120,000 in the 1880s.

By the latter decade,

wool comprised 50 to 60 percent of the value of Argentina's
7
exports. The sheep economy marked the transition from the
colonial estancia and saladero to the modern estancias that
emerged on the coast in the late nineteenth century.
The export sector dominated Argentina*s economy and
society between 1890 and 1914.

Argentina's principal exports

were agricultural products, including wheat, maize, linseed,
8

hides, wool, and beef.

Between 1880 and 1910, the value of

exports increased sixfold.

After 1860, total production

expanded to an annual average of 5 percent, population
by 3.4 percent, the crop area by 8.3 percent, and the railway
9
system by 15.4 percent. Alongside various European countries
and the United States, Argentina appeared to be on the verge
of becoming one of the great nations of the world.
Some archaic characteristics of the Argentine economy
persisted into the twentieth century as large landholdings
remained intact.

Despite sporadic attempts to change

traditional arrangements, few among the elite wanted to modify
the status quo.

By the mid-nineteenth century, concentrated
10

distribution of land ownership became an institutional norm.
Powerful landed oligarchs emerged as a dominant force in the
political and economic life of the nation.

Some 400 families
//
linked by clubs and private associations formed the core of

the elite.

As David Rock states, "It has been estimated that

30.

less than 2,000 persons in Argentina owned as much land as the
total areas of Italy, Belgium, Holland and Denmark added
11

together."
Because of this concentration of economic and political
power, the years between 1880 and 1912 are frequently
referred to as the period of the "oligarchy."

The elite

used its leverage to control the state which served as a
major source of credit and contacts with foreign investors.
To maintain its control over the state apparatus, the
oligarchy set up a system of "disguised repression" to
12

restrict the access of other groups to political office.
The resulting political structure, which emerged at the end
of the nineteenth century, was based on organized fraud.
This process perpetuated the myth of constitutional
liberties, while removing any threat posed by an expanding
electorate.

Coupled with fraud, the oligarchy resorted to

the widespread use of rewards for political loyalties.

With

its distribution of government offices, the state became a
source of political patronage.
The European immigrants to the Rio de la Plata after 1870
had little chance to acquire land.

Given high real estate

values in the province of Buenos Aires, the controlling cattle
and sheep interests had no intention of subdividing and
13
selling their property.
Therefore, in the Buenos Aires
region, the immigrant became a tenant farmer.

Landowners

accepted the European immigrants with the expectation that
//

they would be employed as laborers.

With the ownership of

land out of their reach, the immigrants opted to travel to

31.

Argentina's port cities to establish themselves in rapidlyincreasing urban service occupations.
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
Between 1857 and 1916, 4,758,729 immigrants entered the
14
country.
The flood of immigration during this period
contributed to the rapid growth of urban areas.

The growth

of urban society during these years was in many respects
as politically significant as the transformation of Argentina
under the landed elites.

By 1914 foreigners made up 30
15
percent of Argentina's population.
The majority of the new
arrivals settled in the urbanizing province of Buenos Aires.
(See Table 2.1).
These immigrants rapidly integrated into society.
European customs easily blended with the Hispanic traditions
of Argentina.

Both cultures shared many things in common.

According to one account:
Like the colonial Spaniard, they (the immigrants)
placed particular emphasis on dignity, outward
appearance, and dress, and displayed a fatalistic
attitude toward life along with their fondness for
gambling.
The receptive attitude of Argentines toward the newcomers
promoted their absorption.

The nation's constitutions,

treaties, and laws gave preferential treatment to European
immigrants.

By the early twentieth century, the culture

appeared to be "Italianized Hispanic" as the population
17
increasingly asserted its "Argentinism."
h

The geographical and occupational concentration of
foreigners affected the balance of the social system. The
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TABLE 2.1
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN TOTAL POPULATION
OF EACH CATEGORY OF COUNTIES CLASSIFIED
*
ACCORDING TO SIZE OF URBAN CENTERS, 1869-1914
1869

1895

1914

47

50

49

Other Cities of 100,000
or more

9

34

35

Urban Centers of 50,000
to 99,999

8

18

22

Urban Centers of 20,000
to 49,999

12

23

26

7

19

23

3

9

19

ZONE
Greater Buenos Aires

Urban Centers of 2,000
to 19,999
Urban Centers of less than
2,000 and Populations
outside of Urban Centers
*

Counties classified according to size of major urban center,
taking the population existing in 1947 (uniform areas).
Source:

Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National
Populism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: ‘Transaction
Books, 1978), p. 138.
//
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large influx of immigrants to the central areas created a new
society composed of groups with different native origins who
nonetheless considered themselves to be Argentines.

The new

immigrant culture dominated Buenos Aires and the littoral,
while creole Argentina remained in the interior and isolated
18
sectors of the littoral.
The high rate of upward social mobility was an important
factor contributing to the ready absorption —
non-political channels —

through

of the two-thirds of the population

residing in developed regions.

According to Gino Germani,

the usual pattern was for second generation immigrants to
discard their old ways in favor of a new Argentine identity.
Mobility opportunities reinforced this tendency, as sons of
immigrants emerged into a different class than that of their
19
fathers.
The explosion in the size of the urban middle class was
an important phenomenon.
Buenos Aires —

This group —

concentrated in

grew from 50,000 in 1869 to 660,000 in

1914, making it a strong political force in Argentina before
20
World War I.
The Buenos Aires middle class was divided into
white collar workers and entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and
professionals and administrative officials, on the other.
The former represented the lower middle class, with moderate
economic means and virtually no social prestige.

The latter

represented the upper middle class, prosperous but not
prestigious, which increased rapidly during the 50 years
h

before 1914.

The growth rate of this sector multiplied from

4.1 percent in 1869, to 6.6 percent in 1895, and to 12.4

21
percent in 1914.
Native Argentines, not immigrants, constituted the
majority of these urban professionals and administrative
22
officials.
When the second generation Argentines appeared,
they began to compete for positions in the professions and
state administration.

Broadly speaking, these career patterns

meant that the elite-controlled state managed the mechanisms
of middle-class mobility:

it could increase spending and

widen access to the middle-class groups in high-status
23
positions, or it could restrict them.
ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
The high proportion of exports in Argentina's total
output conditioned economic development during the period
from 1860 to 1930.

Fluctuations in the terms of trade

exerted a major influence on the functioning of Argentina’s
primary-export economy.
Argentine economy

Aldo Ferrer asserts that the

was vulnerable at three

different but

interdependent levels:

employment and domestic income,
24
balance of payments, and public finance.
During the late nineteenth century, the agricultural
and livestock sector employed 35 percent of the labor force
25
and 25 percent of existing capital.
Wages, rents, profits,
and interest (income accruing to workers, proprietors, and
rural entrepreneurs) depended directly on the value of
exports.

An expansion of exports not only raised yfhe level

of employment and income of the population involved with

35.

agriculture but also determined the growth of the economy
as a whole through the multiplier effect of the initial
26
increase in incomeThis higher income of agricultural
workers and entrepreneurs was spent partly on imports and
partly on consumption and investment in the domestic market.
The proportion of income spent in Argentina generated
employment of labor and capital which translated into wages
and profits for workers engaged in the domestically-oriented
sectors.
When exports declined, the farm producers received less
income and reduced their purchases of both imports and
internally-produced goods and services.

This resulted in

the unemployment of capital and labor in the sectors supplying
the domestic market and produced a subsequent drop in incomes
and expenditures in these sectors.
A decline in exports brought about a balance-of-payments
deficit.

Yet, with the introduction of a system of

inconvertible paper currency in 1885, the money supply
became independent of the net balance of transactions with
27
the rest of the world.
The banks increased the money
supply by issuing currency to the government in exchange for
bonds.

However, from this followed an inflationary cycle of

increased paper circulation to meet government expenditures
and to stimulate further economic growth.

As James R. Scobie

notes, "the Juarez Celman administration in 1890 even
28
resorted to clandestine printing of banknotes•"

h

During the forty years of inconvertibility within the
primary-exports economy, fluctuations in the exchange rate

and price instability affected income distribution.

When

currency depreciated, the export sector increased its peso
income in proportion to the depreciation.

The depreciation

raised domestic prices, first of agricultural and livestock
products, which were a major item of expenditure by lowerincome groups, and second of manufactured and imported
commodities, which represented a significant share of total
consumption.

29

Consequently, inflation intensified the

structural factors that conditioned income distribution and
the level of wages.

It discouraged the entrance of immigrants

into Argentina and even led to the emigration of those who
30
had arrived earlier.
During the latter years of the 1880s, popular
dissatisfaction emerged over the worsening economic conditions
and the lack of government responsiveness.

The severe

inflation initially benefited the exporter and the estanciero,
who paid their local costs in depreciating paper and
31
received pounds sterling for their products.
Yet, these
conditions brought economic hardship to the small merchant,
the worker, and the immigrant farmer.

Indicative of the

severity of the inflation and the rapid decline in value of
the paper peso; the salary in gold or gold equivalent
for a skilled worker in Buenos Aires dropped from an average
32
of 1.95 pesos in 1885 to 81 centavos in 1891.
Nonetheless,
the governments of the period maintained close ties to the
cattle export interests and promoted policies favored by
//

those interests.

The policies of the "order and progress"

administration of Julio A. Roca (1880-1886) and Juarez Celman

37.

(1886-1890) laid the foundations for disaster.

33

The economic crisis which emerged in 1890 took its name
from the banking firm of Baring Brothers of Great Britain.
Baring was the first international banking firm to raise
money for Argentina in Europe, and in 1890 it faced bank
ruptcy.

It had undertaken to pay the contractors who had

built the large port works in Buenos Aires.

In return it

received bonds from the Argentine government with a value of
approximately 25 million dollars.

Unfortunately, Baring

discovered that it could not market these bonds.

Confidence

in the capacity of the Argentine government to pay had
34
vanished.
The failure of the loan caused a panic; new British
investment halted, and Argentina's prices on the world market
declined (export earnings fell by approximately 25 percent).
A commercial depression in Argentina ensued as unemployment
35
grew and real wages in Buenos Aires fell almost 50 percent.
Throughout 1890 thousands of new immigrants were unemployed
in Buenos Aires.

Severe distress affected importers and

artisans; public employees were dismissed as the government
attempted to cut back on its expenditures.

Years of breakneck

economic expansion followed by financial and commercial
collapse produced the Revolucion de la Noventa.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
In 1890, 1893, and 1905 three significant armed uprisings
7
occured in reaction to the continuing economic crisis and
institutional grievances.

The first of these —

known as

38.

"La Noventa" —

was important both in its demonstration of the

depth of discontent and in its catalytic effect on the
36
movement which was to become the Union Civica Radical.
Disillusioned by the escallating inflation and corrupt
government, the middle classes began to damand a voice in
politics.

Mainly composed of university students and

professional men, a protest movement formed in Buenos Aires.
On September 1, 1889, a group of about 3,000 persons met to
establish the Unidn Civica de la Juventad.

According to its

statement of principles, this group stood for civil liberties,
free and fair suffrage, guaranteed autonomy for the provinces
and municipalities, more honest administration, and an effort
to improve the performance of public duties.

On April 13,

1890 a specific political group —

the Union Civica —
37
organized under the leadership of Leandro N. Alem.

was

Protests among immigrant farmers for better conditions of
tenure and for harvest payment in gold rather than the
devaluing paper peso began in the 1880s, while the financial
crisis of 1890 ruined many small and medium manufacturers,
swelling the opposition to the Juarez Celman government.

The

military had its own complaint against the administration.
Dissident junior officers and generals joined the protest
activity.
After the revolt began, military elements supported
civilians in street fighting in Buenos Aires that lasted
for three days.

However, the lack of coordination between
//
the civilians and military men permitted national authorities
to bring in reinforcements from garrisons in Rosario and

39.

Cordoba.

38

The insurgents failed in their attempt to overthrow

the government, but the revolt was put down only after a
promise of total amnesty to the participants, leading to
the resignation of President Juarez Celman.

39

The Union Civica gained its first electoral victory in
March 1891 when Leandro N. Alem and Arist6bulo del Valle were
elected national senators from the federal district.

Acrimony

followed as internal dissension dominated a meeting of the
Union Civica*s national committee on June 26, 1891.

A faction

headed by Bartolom^ Mitre adopted the name Uni<5n Civica
Nacional and sought an accord with the governing groups.
Adopting the title of the Union Civica Radical under the
leadership of Alem, the remaining members called for
"relentless struggle" against the governing oligarchy.
Speaking at a mass meeting in December 1891, Alem said:
"They have called us intransigent radicals and we have
accepted this name with pride; and with pride our program
40
is intransigent."
A schism developed within the Union Civica Radical between
Alem and his nephew Hip<5lito Yrigoyen.

In 1893 this rivalry

resulted in two revolutionary plots —

Yrigoyen's insurrection

in the province of Buenos Aires and Alem's uprising in Santa
Fe.

Both failed and the movement remained divided.

However,

Alem's suicide in 1896 put Yrigoyen in command.
After a period of generally improving economic conditions,
the revolt of 1905 did not draw the popular support which went
41
to the earlier two uprisings.
Nonetheless, it caused the

government to declare a state of siege in which the police
closed labor unions and arrested labor leaders.

It also

caused some of the members of the governing elite to begin
thinking seriously about the need to adjust politics to the
changing social structure of the nation.
II.

Institutional Environment

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
To Yrigoyen, Argentina needed a regeneration in public
morality.

His slogans —

national reparation, the cause,

morality —

often sounded more religious than political. He
42
once characterized Radicalism as a "civic religion."
Free
elections and compliance with the constitution were about the
only things on the

U.C.R. political agenda during the years

before 1916.
Yrigoyen*s intransigence was twofold —

electoral

abstention and refusal to participate in coalition
governments.

Since 1892 Yrigoyen repeatedly refused offers

for official preferment.

Similarly, he was at the forefront

of the movement's boycott of elections on the ground that the
balloting was fraudulent.

However, not all Radicals agreed

with Yrigoyen that the movement's only road to power was
through revolution.
Internal conflict developed between those who wanted the
U.C.R. to look and act like a political party and those who
considered it a movement destined to reform the nation through
revolution.

Several provincial Radical parties went against

Yrigoyen and prepared to enter elections.

After the passage

of the Saenz Pena electoral reform in 1911-12, the party's
national committee authorized limited political participation
43
against the leader's views.
In spite if U.C.R. skepticism about the enforcement of
the new law, the Radicals won the 1912 election for national
deputies in the capital and in the province of Santa Fe and
secured minority representation in the provinces of Buenos
Aires, Cordoba, and Entre Rios.

The Radical bloc in the

Chamber of Deputies grew to 28 in 1914 with further victories
in Entre Rios and Santa Fe and minority representation from
44
the capital, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Corrientes, and Mendoza.
In the April 2, 1916 presidential election, the U.C.R.
received a larger popular vote than all the other parties
combined.

The Radicals maintained or improved their positions

in the capital, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Corrientes, Entre Rios,
Mendoza, and Santa Fe. They simultaneously obtained first
time victories in Santiago del Estero and Tucuman.

This

election increased the U.C.R. bloc in the Chamber of Deputies
45
to more than one-third of the Chamber.
Although Yrigoyen attracted a large popular vote,
he did not gain the 151 electoral votes needed to win the
presidency.

The so-called Dissident Radicals of Santa Fe

held the key to the election.

This group controlled that

province, and their 19 electoral votes could have given the
victory to Yrigoyen.

Great suspense and back-stage dealing

ensued, and when the electoral college met on July 20 the
46
Santa Fe dissidents cast their 19 votes for Yrigoyen.

42.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
ADAPTABILITY
President Roque Saenz Pena promoted an electoral reform in
1911-12 which called for universal male suffrage, the secret
ballot, and compulsory voting.

In spite of its democratic

guise, this plan sought to fortify the traditional system.
Assuming the middle classes were committed to existing
economic and political structures, cooptation of the Radicals
appeared to be an appropriate solution to ease the tensions
in society.
The extension of the franchise brought changes to the
Argentine political system.
expanded.

First, the popular base

All Argentine males over 18-years-old could vote.

Second, Argentine elections became closely contested events
—

with winners rarely capturing more than 60 percent of the
47
vote.
Expanded participation and the possibilities for
political opposition helped to strengthen the legitimacy
of governmental structures.
Nonetheless, the Saenz Pefia reform only opened up the
political system in a limited way.
still had to be citizens.

To vote, Argentine males

At the time of its first

application, the electoral law offered voting rights to
48
only 40 or 45 percent of the adult male population.
Since
immigrants made up approximately one-half of the expanding
middle class and an even greater share of the working class
(approximately 60 percent in the urban areas), Peter H. Smith
argues that suffrage extended only "from the upper-class to

43.

49
selected segments of the middle-class."
The electoral reform and consequent redistribution of
political strength were meant •— at least by the
conservatives — * to sustain the longstanding rules of the
50
Argentine political game.
As Smith observes, central to
this arrangement was the idea of a balance of power and
government by consensus or acuerdo.

In spite of the influx

of new groups, political conflict would retain traditional
features including:
(1) Fluid patterns of alignment, and in particular
fluid patterns of party allegiance;
(2) Disregard for class background; and
(3) Continued dependence of the distribution of
political power upon the distribution of
economic power.
To many aristocratic conservatives, the maintenance of these
norms was essential to the legitimacy of the new electoral
politics.

Thus, the inherent inflexibility that was a part

of the political system demonstrates its lack of adaptability.
COMPLEXITY
Yrigoyen began his tenure as President in 1916 with a
minority in the Chamber of Deputies; only one representative
in the Senate; and provincial control limited to Santa Fe,
Cordoba, and Entre Rios.

52

outside the coastal cities.

The Radicals made slow progress
In the interior regions elements

of the population remained insulated from the impact of
7

immigration, urbanism, and the rising middle class.

In these

areas, conservatives continued to dominate the provincial

44.

governments.

This powerful influence in the provinces

assured conservative sovereignty in Congress, especially in
the Senate whose members were chosen by provincial
53
legislatures.
Yrigoyen's subsequent intervention in the provinces
aroused the ire of many conservative interests.

Intervention

is the constitutional method by which the national government
temporarily assumes control of the affairs of any or all of
the provinces.

In a state of intervention, the national

government replaces the governing body with an appointive
54
official who boasts complete power.
Critics of the
president's policy pointed out that Yrigoyen intervened
in the provinces more often (twenty times) during his first
55
term than had any two previous presidents.
These voices of
dissent argued that the president was attempting to enlarge
his own power and that of the Radical Party at the cost of
provincial autonomy.
In the congressional elections of 1918, the U.C.R. gained
16 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, thereby giving it a
slight majority in that house.

The interventions combined

with free elections helped the Radicals to gain control of the
government in the capital, as well as in the provinces of
56
Mendoza, San Juan, La Rioja, Catamarca, and Buenos Aires.
Despite the movement's success at the polls, Yrigoyen failed
to amass a majority in the Senate.

This lack of support

endangered the passage of Yrigoyen's legislative reform
package.

In addition to the conservative opposition, the

president and his movement faced hostility from the

45.

Socialists, who thought the Radical's social program was
insufficiently reformist, and from the Progressive Democrats,
57
who were simply anti-Yrigoyen.
In an effort to gain the support of the emergent working
class, Yrigoyen's labor policy included plans for protective
58
social legislation support by charity and patronage.
Between 1916 and 1919, the president backed several strikes,
particularly those against the railway and maritime sectors
which were dominated by foreign capital.

This support was

tantamount to intervention, as the government refused to
deploy the police to break strikes. On some occasions,
Yrigoyen used the power of the presidency to urge employers
to comply with the demands of labor.
Middle and upper classes resented what they perceived as
government capitulation to labor. Consequently, few of the
government's proposals for reform became law. The Radical's
failure to implement even modest proposals for industrial
development or tariff protection embittered the urban lower
sectors.

With the downturn in the economy in 1913 and

depressed conditions until 1918, the government faced growing
social unrest.

In the city of Buenos Aires, labor strife

culminated in the January 1919 "Tragic Week," when the
59
government ordered military intervention to restore order.
In many ways Yrigoyen's labor policy proved counter
productive.

It contributed to an upswing in labor activity

and unionization between 1916 and 1920.

But the relationship
7

between the Radical government and labor remained tenuous
at best, and the protective role of the state failed to become

46.

60
institutionalized.

By its incapacity to bridge the regional

and social divisions in society, the Radical government failed
Huntington's test of complexity.
AUTONOMY
The political success of the Radicals depended heavily on
Yrigoyen's personal leadership and a system of local party
bosses and their machine organizations.

The Radicals took

over the patronage network that the landowning elite used so
effectively to buy off their opposition.

Yrigoyen's political

strategy combined machine politics with populist appeals
61
in an attempt to build a mass movement.
Yrigoyen's personality traits facilitated the process of
mass political organizing.

Argentine essayist and social

critic Ezequiel Martinez Estrada wrote of Yrigoyen that he
"embodied (a) transcendental and magic reality in his person,
62
in his mentality and in his acts as apostle and martyr."
This man of mystery with his paternal aloofness was not far
63
removed from the Rosas tradition of oligarchic populism.
In 1922 tensions surfaced over the selection of
Yrigoyen's successor.

These strains subsided when Yrigoyen

announced that Marco T. de Alvear was his choice.

Problems

reemerged in 1924 when the Party split along social lines into
two camps: the middle class pro-Yrigoyen personalists and the
patrician pro-Alvear anti-personalists.

Analyzing electoral
/
data, Smith finds that, "the higher the Status, the more
64
Antipersonalist (or less Personalist) the stance."

47.

Smith's data point to the relevance of regional conflict
in the Radical Party split.

The dispute reflected the

cleavage between Buenos Aires (both city and province),
where Yrigoyen had most thoroughly developed his political
machine, and the rest of the country.
the coast against the interior.

This division pitted

Yrigoyen's subsequent efforts

to subordinate interior interests to those of the littoral
further antagonized the Party's provincial supporters.

In

Mendoza and San Juan, for example, local populist leaders who
had originally supported the Radicals, broke away from the
65
movement.
It is important to note that for groups organized
according to class or regional loyalties, the party machine
was incapable of performing many direct personal services.
What these groups would be likely to be interested in was
government "policy responsiveness" to their interests rather
than handouts of jobs and sinecures.

Thus, while the machine

organization proved invaluable for electoral purposes, it
limited the government's capacity to engage in autonomous
policy formulation.
LEGITIMACY
The implementation of the Saenz Perla law precipitated
changes in voting patterns.

Instead of the old acuerdo

system, officials arrived at political decisions in a more
open manner.

In particular. Smith points to the increasing
/

number of contested roll calls in the Chamber of Deputies as
evidence of the decline in the political power-sharing

48.
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arrangement.
After the split between the middle-class Yrigoyen wing
and the upper-class Alvear faction of the Radical Party in
1924, the Yrigoyenist U.C.R. held two-thirds of the seats in
in the lower chamber by 1930.

Similarly, in the upper chamber

the Yrigoyenist Radicals made inroads into the power base of
the conservatives.

Smith finds that partisan ballots jumped

from low levels before the electoral reform to high and
67
moderate levels after 1916.
By 1928, deviations from the
party line manifested themselves only rarely as the
Yrigoyenist U.C.R. formed an effective voting bloc in both
houses of the legislature.
Party conflict assumed an air of social conflict.

Upper-

class elements which figured prominently in both the
Radical and the conservative contingents elected to the
lower chamber from 1916 to 1918 decreased significantly
during the 1920s.

The break between Yrigoyen and the Alvear

factions virtually eliminated the patrician elements from
the legislature after 1924.

By 1928-30, only 19 percent
68
of the U.C.R.'s partisans were from the upper class.
A new generation of Radical Party professionals firmly
entrenched themselves in influencial positions within the

bureaucracy.

This displacement of the conservative elites

became a source of major contention.

As one contemporary

observer complained:
/

The Congress was full of rabble and unspeakable
hoodlums. The parliamentary language used up to
then had been replaced by the coarse language of
the outskirts of the city and the Radical's
committees.69
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Synonymous with this internal subversion of the political
system was the remodeling of the patronage mechanism to suit
middle-class interests.
Just as the parliamentary apparatus fell under the
control of middle-class interests, Yrigoyen continued to
extend his personal power through the centralized presidency.
Receiving almost total compliance from the legislature from
1926 to 1929, Yrigoyen moved to implement popular programs.
Difficulties in achieving these reforms encouraged the
president to resort to more interventions in the provinces
to enforce order and compliance with his programs.

Of 93

such actions from 1862 to 1930, 34 took place during the
70
14-year period of Radical rule.
The distribution of
political power thus became concentrated in the Radical camp.
When Yrigoyen returned to the presidency in 1928, his
government was thoroughly middle class.

Government patronage

expanded to its limits as Yrigoyen attempted to maintain his
political support in the midst of an economic decline.

Rock

observes that, "By June 1929, it was reported that jobs were
71
being sold on the open market. *'
Yrigoyen's attempt to turn
the Army into a source of patronage proved disastrous.

Many

officers resented this move to instill partisan loyalties
among the top ranks of the military. In response to the
government's departure from traditional norms and Yrigoyen's
intervention into military affairs, these officers, like the
72
conservatives, lost confidence in the Radical government.
From the mid-1920s to their fall from power, the Radicals
violated the long-standing rules of the political game.
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Partisan politics replaced fluid party allegiances as the
Radicals became the dominant voice in the decision-making
process.

Through their steady growth in power, the Radicals

gradually transformed the economic and social bases of
government.

To halt this process, the conservatives had to

rely on help from the disloyal opposition within the ranks of
the military.
Yrigoyen's popular appeal was his main source of power
when the economic crisis of 1929 began.

Yet, the inability of

his government to deal effectively with the crisis excited
the wrath of the economic elites.

In addition, the urban

middle class turned against the government because its income,
tied to foreign trade, plummeted.

As the crisis deepened,

public confidence in the government's legitimacy eroded, and
the Radicals lost the March 1930 legislative elections in
their former stronghold -- Buenos Aires.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Two important elements came to view Argentine democracy
as illegitimates
military.

conservative civilians and segments of the

On August 9, 1930, legislators from the opposition

parties published the "Manifesto of the Forty-four,"
protesting Yrigoyen’s "arbitrary and despotic" rule and
calling for the need to "save Argentina’s democratic
73
institutions and prevent the ruin of the country."
On August 13, military members led by General Josi F.
7

Uriburu made a pledge to overthrow the Yrigoyen government.
At subsequent public rallies for the Manifesto of the Forty-
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four, Antipersonalist leaders in Buenos Aires and Entre Rios
urged the population to rise up in alliance against the
74
government.
As the possibilities for a coup materialized, Yrigoyen
fell ill.

His Minister of War, General Luis Dellepiane,

called for the president to take decisive action against the
conspirators.

Yet, Yrigoyen failed to respond —

because of his illness.

perhaps

Dellepiane quit on September 2.

Two days later, the Dean of the Buenos Aires Law School
asked Yrigoyen to resign for the good of the nation.
Yrigoyen complied that same afternoon, but it was too late
75
to stop the coup.
On September 6, a group of cadets from the Campo de Mayo
garrison, led by General Jos^ F. Uriburu, marched into the
capital and easily assumed control.

Many groups in society

greeted the news with satisfaction.

The parties called for

a return to the constitution and for new elections.
Ill.

Conclusion

This examination of the interaction of socio-economic
variables during the period from 1880 to the First World War
indicates that growing political instability was associated
with the onset to economic decline after a period of improving
conditions.

Reflecting the frustrations of the emergent

middle class, the revolts of 1890 and 1893 occurred during
periods of poor economic performance.

This turmoil

notwithstanding, the economic elites were largely successful
in their bid to coopt the emergent middle class into the
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traditional political system.
However, the mobilization of middle-class groups into
politics challenged the rigid structure of the system.
Yrigoyen's government did not uphold the traditional acuerdo
methods balancing the distribution of power.

Instead,

the president relied on his personal leadership skills to
organize a popular movement.

Yrigoyen's uncompromising

stance and the machine character of Radicalism militated
against policy responsiveness on behalf of different groups
and interests in society.

Neglecting to establish any

coherent rules or structures. Radicalism eventually succumbed
to a backlash reaction to restore the traditional political
order.
The Conservatives wanted democracy to uphold the
traditional rules of the game, but the pursuit of democracy
led to the violation of those rules.

This was the rational

behind the coup that removed Yrigoyen from power.

According

to the analysis of this study, it appears that the conjunction
of high participation and low institutionalization increases
the inclination of disaffected elites to resort to illegal
power seizures.

Perhaps this is because in such situations

the burdens created by mass mobilization have outrun the
capabilities of political institutions, and elites see coups
as alternative means to restore order.
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CHAPTER III
THE PERONIST PERIOD, 1946-1955
This chapter examines some of the factors behind the
rise of Peronism.

The analysis, which builds on the

discussion of the Radical period, centers on the role of rapid
economic and social changes in fostering the growth of this
popular movement.

It focuses on the political behavior which

contributed to the demise of the Peronist government in 1955.
I.

Operational Environment
The conservative successors of the Radical governments

bypassed and manipulated constitutional rules to stay
in power during the 1930s.

The coalition of conservatives,

anti-personalist Radicals, and Independent Socialists,
calling itself the Concordancia, placed General Agustin
Justo in the presidency.

In the 1931 elections, the

Concordancia captured 63 percent of the seats in the Chamber
1
of Deputies and 87 percent of those in the Senate.
The
newly-formed coalition soon returned to the conventional
practice of excluding opponents from the initiation and
formulation of policy.
During the Depression, the collapse of foreign''trade
forced the authorities to adopt economic measures to
59.
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stimulate industrial growth.

The Justo administration's

exchange controls and multiple exchange rates, coupled with
2
higher tariffs, benefitted the industrialists. More important
perhaps than government policies, the growing demand of
Argentine consumers combined with reduced imports increased
the value of Argentine manufacturing by 54 percent between
3
1935 and 1945.
By the late 1940s light industry had significantly
expanded so that the proportion of GNP generated by
manufacture outstripped that by agriculture and cattle
4
breeding.
(See Table 3.1). Gilbert Merkx provides further
evidence of industry’s growth.

Between 1935 and 1939 the

GDP grew by 15 percent, but agriculture's contribution
increased by only 2 percent, while that of industry grew
5
by 24 percent.
Nevertheless, both the industrial and landowning sectors
were economically intertwined.

As Gustavo Polit argues,

the vague boundaries that separated them were attenuated
through the investment of agrarian rent in industry and the
6
investment of industrial profit in agriculture.
The
industrialists approved of the latifundia, or the large
estate system, which provided industry with a cheap labor
force of displaced tenant farmers.

Describing this situation

in 1943, Torcuato Di Telia pointed out:
Much has been said about the idyllic life in the
country. But what is actually seen of it in our
wide territory does not agree with what is said
about it; the farmer leaves the farm at the fiirst
opportunity and heads for the urban centers,
in spite of the city's unhealthy housing
conditions, promiscuity, and insecurity of
daily work. »

TABLE 3.1

PROPORTION OF GNP GENERATED BY MANUFACTURE AND
BY AGRICULTURE AND CATTLE BREEDING, 1930-1954

YEARS

MANUFACTURE

AGRICULTURE
AND CATTLE
BREEDING

(PERCENT OF GNP)

Source:

1930

18.6

21.4

1935

19.3

27.5

1940

20.6

24.5

1945

22.8

20.1

1950

23.4

15.5

1954

22.1

17.2

Gino Germani, "Social Modernization and Economic
Development in Argentina," Report prepared for
the United Nations Research Institute/ for Social
Development, 1970, p. 63.
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Thus, the symbiosis between industrialists and land holders
worked to the disadvantage of the provincial lower class.
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION
The influx of immigrants, which had continued for half
a century, declined sharply in the 1930s, partly because
Argentina was no longer the land of opportunity and partly
because the government restricted immigration.

As

immigration declined, migration from the rural interior
contributed to urbanization.

Although there is no census

data between 1914 and 1947, Gino Germani asserts that growing
internal migration, beginning in the mid-1930s, coincided
with the shift from agriculture, the great jump in the demand
8
for industrial labor, and the end of overseas immigration.
By 1936 approximately 83,000 domestic migrants arrived
annually in the greater Buenos Aires area.

During the

following decade, this total increased to more than 96,000
9
annual arrivals. Germani estimates that, from 1936 to 1947,
internal migrants to the Buenos Aires area surged from
400,000 to 1.5 million.

Most migrants who travelled to the

urban centers were from the less developed regions of the
interior.

The previous experience of these individuals

reflected a rural, non-industrial life style.

Thus, the great

migration fused immigrant and creole Argentina; it linked the
littoral with the interior.
This transformation and displacement affected jthe entire
/

country.

Table 3.2 indicates that these newcomers began to

rival the foreign-born population in the principal urban

TABLE 3.2

POPULATION OF THE BUENOS AIRES
METROPOLITAN AREA INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
SOURCE OF ITS COMPOSITION (1869-1957)

% BORN
INTERIOR

YEAR

TOTAL
POPULATION

% BORN
ABROAD

1869

250,000

47

3

1895

783,000

50

8

1914

2,035,000

49

11

1936

3,430,000

36

12

1947

4,720,000

26

29

1957

6,370,000

22

36

AV. ANNUAL
NO. MIGRANTS
FROM INTERIOR

8,000

83,000

96,000

Source:

Gino Germani, "Transformation of the Social and
Political Structure," Why Perdn Came to Power:
The Background to Peronism in Argentina
ed. Joseph R. Barager (New York: Alfred A . Knopf,
1968), p. 124.
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areas.

Gino Germani finds that, "In 1947 between one-half

and 70 percent of the [preexisting urban workers] had been
10
replaced by new workers in the Buenos Aires area."
Economic
change measured by industrial growth thus served to alter
radically the social and political landscape.

In his analysis

of Peronist electoral support, Lars Schoultz finds that areas
undergoing industrial change tended to have a rapidly growing
population, working class in social composition, that
exhibited relatively little economic satisfaction.

His

statistical findings indicate that the size of an area's
working-class population and its rate of industrial growth
explain a large percentage (84 percent) of the vote for
11
Peronism.
ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
An examination of the wage share of national income
reveals why many Argentines experienced economic
dissatisfaction.

Table 3.3 presents some measures of the

share of wages in the national income.

Column (1) shows the

wage and salary share of national income if capital
consumption allowances are estimated at original cost.
Column (2) displays the wage and salary share of national
income if capital consumption allowances are estimated at
replacement cost.

The trend is the same in both cases.

Column (1) indicates that the wage share remained within the
12
43 to 47 percent range from 1935 to 1947.
^
While the wage share of national income remained
relatively constant during these years, the number of people

TABLE 3.3
WAGE SHARE OF NET DOMESTIC INCOME

YEAR

(1)

1935

46.8

46.1

1936

46.9

46.0

1937

44.4

43.9

1938

46.6

46.2

1939

46.3

46.3

1940

46.0

46.4

1941

45.3

45.7

1942

43.1

43.5

1943

44.1

44.4

1944

44.8

45.2

1945

45.9

46.7

1946

45.2

46.8

1947

46.6

47.9

(2)

(1 )
Capital consumption allowances estimated at original
cost.
(2 )
Capital consumption allowances estimated at replacement
cost.

h

Source:

Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., "Economic Growth and Income
Distribution In Postwar Argentina,M Inter-American
Economic Affairs 20 (Winter 1966): 25.
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employed in industrial-related activities exploded.
Table 3.4 reveals that the number of employees and workers
in industry increased 130 percent between 1935 and 1946.
During these years the total industrial labor force rose
12 percent annually.

Table 3.5 indicates that by 1946 there

were over one million persons working in industry,
concentrated in the Buenos Aires area.

This industrial

labor force accounted for more than 17 percent of the
economically-active population.
The leaders of the nation's dominant labor organization,
the Confederacies General del Trabajo (CGT), protested the
government's disregard for labor's problems.

These

complaints grew louder as real wages leveled off and
unemployment increased.

Real wages for industrial workers

-- which doubled during the 1920s —

remained about the

same throughout the 1930s, declining somewhat after 1935.
By 1933 approximately 334,000 workers, or 7 percent of the
13
work force, were unemployed.
These economic problems
underlay the mounting social frustration.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The industrial working class, which approached one-fifth
of the economically-active population at the outbreak of the
Second World War, could no longer be overlooked.

This

unorganized group represented a potentially powerful political
bloc, as native Argentine workers entered an expanding pool of

a

eligible voters.
representation.

Yet, they had virtually no political
For example, only the Socialists stood up for
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TABLE 3.4
GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE, 1935-1946
% INC.
35-46

ANNUAL
% INC.

1935

1943

1946

49,295

87,778

135,484

176

16

Workers

418,020

756,222

938,387

124

11

Total
Industrial
Labor Force

467,315

844,000

1,073,870

130

12

GROUP
Employees

TABLE 3.5
RELATIVE SIZE OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE:
ECON.
ACTIVE
POP.

1895-1946
I.L.F.
AS %
E.A.P.

YEAR

INDUSTRIAL
LABOR
FORCE

1895

118, 835

1,601,826

7

1914

389, 716

3,119,148

12

1946

1,073, 871

6,267,313

17

Sources

Gilbert Wilson Merkx, "Political and Economic
Change in Argentina from 1870 to 1966," (mimeog.
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), p. 191.

.
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working-class interests in the Chamber of Deputies, but they
were far too small a group to gain significant support for
14
legislation.
Thus, before Per<5n's rise to power, attempts
by leaders of the urban lower class to promote urban mass
interests were continually frustrated by the established
constitutional institutions and procedures.
The Conservative rulers' traditional practices discredited
party politics and constitutional government in the eyes of
many Argentines.

In particular, the military lost confidence

in the ability of the politicians to maintain stable political
order.

When President Ramon Castillo attempted to secure

military support behind Robustiano Patr<5n Costas (President
of the Senate and leader of the Conservatives), as his
successor in 1943, several key officers resisted.

The

movement against Castillo expanded in 1943 as economic
growth came to a standstill.

Finally, on the morning of

June 4, troops under the command of General Arturo Rawson
moved through Buenos Aires toward the Casa Rosada.

The

ensuing fall of Castillo meant the end to the Conservative
restoration in Argentine politics.
Colonel Juan Domingo Per6n did not lead the coup, but he
was an active participant in it as a member of a nationalist,
pro-Axis faction of young officers.

He immediately set out

to establish a place for himself in the new regime.

Through

his contacts with the elite, Per<£n received a post as head of
the Department of Labor and Social Security.

From, this
/

position he organized thousands of workers and built a loyal
following by rewarding unions that supported him with

favorable collective bargaining settlements and social
security benefits while punishing those who refused to accept
15
his leadership.
After years of receiving poor service from
socialist and anarchist leaders who could not secure better
wages and social services, Argentine laborers quickly fell in
step with Per&i's juggernaut.
Per<3n's status as the spokesman for labor produced
distrust among his rivals in the government.

On October 9,

1945, a group of officers led by General Avalos forced the
government to oust Peron.

His subsequent arrest and exile to

Martin Garcia Island in the Plate estuary was greeted with
unprecedented public outcry.

In fear of an uprising, the

government called back Perc5n to control the situation.
In his triumphant return, Peron resigned his commission
and announced his candidacy for the presidency.

His victory

in the 1946 elections with 54 percent of the popular vote and
Peronist majorities in both houses of Congress represented a
mandate•
II.

Institutional Environment

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Peron's government immediately concerned itself with
satisfying the workers' demand for dignity and equal status
in Argentine society.

He proclaimed that the workers were the

essence of the new Argentine nation and that his
ft

administration represented a government of the masses.
He defined the new regime to be one with a profoundly
proletariat and worker base where the acts of government would
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16
be inspired by the masses.
The workers' support for Per<5n came from a perception
of their interests rather than simply from their admiration
of his special leadership style.

For instance, Per6n

initiated new campaigns to increase the workers 1 feeling of
dignity, equal status, and communal identity.

This drive

led to the incorporation of labor's rights into the
Constitution of 1949.

Article 37 of the Constitution
17
specifically enumerated the rights of the worker.
Labor's

response was overwhelmingly favorable.

As Samuel Baily notes,

"Because of Per<5n, the law and the government finally
guaranteed the workers a meaningful identity as part of
18
society."
In satisfying some of the economic and social
needs of all sectors of the labor movement, Peron's political
changes brought the workers increasingly under the influence
of the state.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION
ADAPTABILITY
An adjustment in the political order did not accompany
the rapid changes which occurred during Argentina's economic
modernization in the years before World War II.

Instead, the

severe conditions under which the political system functioned
after 1930 inhibited its ability to absorb new levels of
participation.

The attempt to reestablish a "limited
/

democracy" based on power-sharing between the conservative
elites added new rigidities precisely at the moment when

71.

maximum flexibility was required.
In order to accomodate the recently mobilized groups
within the political system, Gino Germani argues that either
the existing political parties had to be altered or a new one
had to be created.

In practice Argentine political parties

offerred no outlet for the needs of urban labor.

As Germani

observes s
The political elite was unable to understand the
economic and social changes that were occurring
so rapidly and the Socialist Party, especially,
as well as the unions, did not effectively take
advantage of the political potential offered by
the new industrial workers. '
Thus, the political system's lack of adaptability indirectly
contributed to the rise of Juan Peron.
COMPLEXITY
PercSn's charismatic appeal helped to build a populist
coalition composed of three main groups:
(1) The original (anti-status quo) elite,
• • • drawn from the marginal industrialists,
Radical Right intellectuals, traditional
Church groups, and armed forces with a
Falangista inclination.
(2) The new masses, made up mostly of the recent
arrivals from the countryside and those lower
sectors of the urban working class that had never
been organized before, but also comprising many
old trade unionists who joined the coalition once
its populist character was apparent.
(3) Some of the impoverished middle classes from
the interior of the country, who had been excluded
by the previous oligarchic system. Many of them
were represented by old Radical Party leaders,
and some Conservative caudillos who joined forces
with Per6n.20
b
The Peronist multi-class coalition thus shifted the balance
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of electoral power in Argentina.

Peron's initial power-

sharing arrangement called for the creation of a corporate
state organizing society according to functional groups. As
the chief mediator of political conflicts, the state would
also ensure social harmony.
According to Eldon Kenworthy, to rule in Argentina during
the late 1940s required something like the coalition that
Peron forged.

Kenworthy further asserts that keeping

such a coalition together required the economic policies
21

that Peron adopted.

Per£n's economic approach relied on

some of the same techniques that the industrial countries in
Europe and North America had employed in their post-depression
recoveries. Argentina's economic decision-makers hoped that
deficit spending would restore prosperity.

This strategy

relied on developing import-substitution industries while
simultaneously stimulating demand for the items produced
internally.

Central to this plan was the redistribution of

income and power from rural producers to urban consumers and
industrialists through fiscal, price, wage, and credit
22
measures•
As Argentina's external position worsened, especially
after the droughts of 1950 and 1951, the protected industries
could no longer be propped up with profits from the export
sector.

In announcing the Emergency Economic Plan of 1952,

Peron asked the industrialists for patience while the
government restored the country's capacity to import fuels and
23
f
raw materials.
Per6n succeeded by 1953 in restoring a
positive payments balance and an increase in the gross
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national product.

But this period also witnessed an

acceleration in the decapitalization of the private sector and
growing uncertainty which sapped entrepreneurial confidence.
Although production increased impressively, it still fell 50
percent below the record levels of the war years.

24

Peron's

economic measures proved insufficient for maintaining the
support of Argentine industrialists.
The leaders of the rural sector were among the first to
denounce Peron*s policies. The cattlemen of the Rural Society
and the Confederation of Rural Associations of Buenos Aires
and La Pampa (CARBAP) protested their sudden eviction from
the agricultural policy-making process as well as their loss
of income through controlled prices.

Tenant farmers, on the

other hand, supported Peronist legislation which extended the
rent controls adopted by the military government in 1943 for
another five years, with a three-year renewal option.

Still,

Peronist reforms eventually led to complaints from both the
landowners and the tenant farmers because commodity price
control measures hurt large and small farmers alike,
25
especially after 1948.
(

This loss of upper-middle-class support impaired the
Peronist coalition's ability to mobilize the masses in the
interior.

These unorganized groups returned to supporting

local Conservative or Radical caudillos. With the widening
rift developing between the city and the countryside, Per<5n's
coalition lost its other non-working-class sectors the
26
h
provincial middle-class.
With support declining from the
other two legs of the populist triad, the complexity of
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Peron's government decreased significantly.

Thus, Peron was

forced to rely on the continued loyalty of organized labor.
AUTONOMY
Personalism was the cement that held Peronism together
between 1946 and 1955.

From 1946 to 1948, ideological

conflict was rife within Peronist ranks between the
autonomously-inclined unionists and a variety of opportunist
and nationalist factions.

The mounting discord provided Peron

with a convenient rationale for centralizing the party under
his personal control.

On May 23, 1946, Peron declared the

electoral coalition dissolved.

His call to unity meant the

end of previously independent parties and factions, assuring
the defection of prominent political leaders to the Peronist
camp.

He then ordered the formation of a new group, the
27
Parti do Unico de la Revoluci<5n.
The organization of a single party began in January
1947.

The new Partido Peronista remained divided.

areas of controversy persisted:

Two

the competition among

various local interests; and the struggle between Peronists
28
and those favoring union autonomy.
Walter Little stresses
the importance of the latter schism between the unions and the
politicians.

Per£n frowned on the unions, which continued to

demand the right to participate equally and directly in party
affairs.

In the Peronist political organization, there was

no room for alternative sources of power.

/
/

Per6n demanded that independent labor groups subordinate
themselves to his state-run political organization.

Under
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this pressure, the independent labor list finished a
distant second in the December 1947 elections with 3,591
votes compared to the first-place finish of the official list
29
with 14,591 votes.
Support for union autonomy virtually
30
disappeared by the end of the following year.
The eclipse of
internal opposition led the party to reorganize along strict
Peronist lines.
It appeared that nothing was beyond Peron's grasp.

In

his attempt to revise the Constitution of 1853, Peron
flaunted his power after winning clear control of the
constitutional convention of 1948 (the Peronist Party elected
31
109 delegates while the U.C.R. won only 48 delegates).
The
convention amended 53 articles of the Constitution, repealed
32
nine articles as obsolete, and added six new articles.
An important clause against presidential succession was one
of the articles repealed, thereby allowing Peron to remain in
power.

Through these measures, Peron became the dominant

political force in the country.
Walter Little argues that, given this accumulation of
power, subsequent developments involving the party can best be
understood in terms of Peron's personal vision.

Because of

his distrust of the common people, Peron insisted on rigorous
codes of unity and discipline to increase the effectiveness
of the party's organization.

Peron sought to mold public

attitudes in keeping with the doctrina nacional or
Justicialism.

Pursuant to this ideology, the Peropist Party

would guide the country toward a political position lying
somewhere between capitalism and socialism.
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Per<£n's autocratic leadership style eventually undermined
the prestige and autonomy of the Peronist Party.

The

Peronists' unwillingness to compromise with the other
interests in society nullified their initial popular appeal.
As Little observes:
The Peronists sought a revolution in political
culture without any serious changes in structure,
and this contradiction accounts for their failure
to transcend personalism and create and effective
party.
Perc5n attempted to retain personal power by strengthening
his Partido Peronista.

In place of the traditional political

institutions, the party was to become the sole source of
political authority.

Nevertheless, Walter Little concludes

that one of the most important characteristics of the Peronist
34
movement was its lack of an effective political party.
Likewise, the personalism in the political organization of
Peronism undermined the autonomy of national political
institutions.
LEGITIMACY
Peronist policies led not to harmony, but to increased
political conflict.

Per6n's design for a corporate society

allowed few opportunities for the expression of dissent.

The

Chamber of Deputies became the scene of intense partisan
rivalry as the Peronist delegates used roll-call votes to
demonstrate their solidarity and to intimidate the opposition.
The effort of Radicals to resist the Peronist onslaught at
h

times appeared futile.

For example, in April 1953, the pro

government deputies temporarily expelled opposition elements
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from the chamber. Not surprisingly, Congress remained
consistently compliant to the demands of the executive, as the
Peronist deputies acted with near-unanimity on most issues.
With the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms of political
opposition, open confrontations erupted between social
groups, especially after the onset of economic decline in
the early 1950s.

The upper and middle classes mobilized

against the government's favoritism toward labor interests.
In this environment of mounting social tensions, Per6n
tried to demonstrate his political strength.

First, he

consolidated his control over the armed forces.

A majority of

Peronists in Congress empowered him to promote, demote, or
retire officers at will.

Second, an act of Congress

authorized him to create a new martial law, referred to as the
"state of internal war," which called for the death penalty to
35
deter rebel activity.
The Church was one of the first groups to disassociate
itself from the regime.

Demonstrating its independence, it

began training labor leaders outside the officially sanctioned
Peronist institutions.

In December 1954 Per<Sn responded with

a congressional act that made divorce legal for the first
time in Argentina? in May 1955, the government removed
religious instruction from the schools. The Church reacted
with mass demonstrations against the government.

Per6n

retaliated by expelling two of the organizing priests from
the country.

Within days of this action, the Vatican

excommunicated those involved in ordering the expulsions,
including Per<Sn and his cabinet.
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Elements of the armed forces bristled under Peron's
requirement that they take an oath of loyalty to the
constitutionally-sanctioned national doctrine.

This

perceived insult was made worse when Peron required them
to receive instruction in the doctrine.

The armed forces

felt threatened by these challenges to its professional
autonomy.

Some accounts suggest that the cause of the

revolt of June 1955 may have been connected to an order
making the study of the doctrine obligatory in the Navy, the
36
service least loyal to the regime.
These instances of
opposition to Peronist political prescriptions culminated in
a crisis of legitimacy for Peronism.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
At 12:45 p.m. on June 16, 1955, Navy planes attacked
the Casa Rosada. and Marine troops advanced on the capital.
Civilian conspirators seized a radio station and proclaimed
37
a "democratic revolution."
Despite these events, the Army
remained loyal to Per^n and put down the revolt.

In the

aftermath, Peron began an erratic course marked by indecision
and actions that alienated supporters in the unions and the
Armed Forces.
Among the officers who subsequently rebelled, some, like
General Eduardo Lonardi, were right-wing Catholics who worked
closely with a civilian conspiratorial group of Catholicnationalists led by Mario Amadeo.
officers —

Two other groups of
//
conservative democrats led by General Pedro

Aramburu and liberal democrats led by Admiral Isaac Rojas —
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joined the Lonardi-Amadeo group m

. .
38
opposition.

The resistance also included middle and upper-middleclass elements —

a liberal opposition formed partly in

reaction to Peron's repression of the universities and the
Church.

The U.C.R. became the principal voice of the

alienated civilian elements calling for Pertin's resignation.
The U.C.R.'s support for the military coup made the
difference between a rerun of the abortive effort of June 1955
and the successful action in September.
On September 16, 1955, the Cordoba Army garrison, most
of the Navy, and segments of the Air Force revolted.

Army

units from Buenos Aires moved to quell the rebellion, and
they succeeded in retaking most of Cordoba within 24 hours.
The rebels, however, held on for two more days. During this
period, other small garrisons joined the rebellion.

Threats

mounted against the regime as the fleet, after shelling
Mar de Plata, set sail for Buenos Aires.
Although Peron's position was strong —

he still had the

support of a major part of the Army and the labor movement
and the acquiescence of the general population —
to mounting pressure.

he gave in

On September 19 he turned the

presidency over to a group of loyalist generals.

Boarding a

Paraguayan gunboat, Peron made a temporary exit from
Argentine politics.
Ill.

Conclusion
/
/

The economic expansion and industrialization between
1935 and 1946 spurred a major internal migration in
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Argentina.

Policies increasing consumption, expanding

employment of the urban working class, and broadening
possibilities for upward mobility initially provided adequate
channels for offsetting the strains of rapid social
mobilization.

Nevertheless, lack of improvement in real wages

and in political representation for the urban workers under
Conservative administrations during the 1930s contributed to
new demands on government.
The rigidity of the political system to working class
needs stimulated the growth of the Peronist movement.
Between 1946 and 1949, Perc^n utilized his personal popularity
and the powers of the presidency to consolidate his control
over the political system. However, the personalism inherent
in the operation of Peronism discouraged the formation of
working relationships between different socio-economic
interests.

The subordination of party and state structures

to the loose organization of Peronism failed to produce a more
durable system of government.

Peron never gave his rules and

practices the firm institutional foundation needed to sustain
them.
Peronism opened up the political process to many who
had been disenfranchised in the past.

Yet, this movement

failed to produce strong new structures to regulate political
conduct.

Per<Sn's use of personal authority in an attempt to

regulate the behavior of all the other interests proved
destabilizing in the longrun.

Hence, the Peronist experience
//
provides evidence to support Huntington's notion of the
destructive capabilities of political decay.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALFONSIN

According to Samuel P. Huntington, revolution is most
likely to occur in societies which have experienced some
social and economic development and where, "the processes of
political modernization and political development have
1

lagged behind the processes of social and economic change."
During the Radical and Per<Sn periods, Argentine society
underwent two incomplete revolutions.

In both cases, an

explosion of political participation occurred. Yet, in both
periods a second phase was missing:

the creation and

institutionalization of a new political order.

As Eldon

Kenworthy remarks, "Were Samuel Huntington analyzing
Argentina, he would say that the political system was
2
definitely modern, yet imperfectly developed."
I . Institutionalization of the Reformist Alternative
ADAPTABILITY
The victory of RatSl Alfonsfn in the 1983 elections
signalled a movement away from Argentina's authoritarian
politics.

Three processes were apparent during thfe popular

mobilization of the 1983 electoral campaign.
85.

First,
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polarization of support occurred between the two major
parties.

Second, the Radicals made significant advances with

their mass rallies in the federal capital and in the principal
cities.

Alfonsin, himself, played an important role with his

anti-dictatorial and often anti-militarist stance.

The third,

related process was the decline in support for the Peronists.
For the first time in the 40-year history of the movement,
the Argentine people as well as the industrial working-class
3
voted against Peronism. October 1983 ushered in a new era.
Alfonsin won by a margin of 52 percent of the popular
vote to 40 percent for the Peronist candidate, former Senate
president Italo A. Luder.

Alfonsin won 57 percent of the

votes in the electoral college, and the Radicals won a clear
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, capturing 129 of the 254
4
seats. The Peronists won 111 seats.
Yet, while the opportunity for establishing stable
constitutional government has never been better, the
problems facing the administration are very severe.

In

addition to a $43 billion foreign debt, Alfonsin must handle
increased union protests fueled by the depressed economy
and popular demands for justice concerning the crimes
committed by past military leaders.

The fate of Alfonsin*s

experiment with democracy will depend much on his ability to
control the labor movement and the Army in the context of
economic decline.
In a country that once chose between movements,and the
7

military, these changes represent a shift toward greater
system adaptability. The election was a rejection of extremes
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and suggests that the political system may be stabilizing
around two major parties. The politics of national
reconciliation currently replace the antiquated Peronist/
anti-Peronist dialogue.
COMPLEXITY
In his drive to reestablish political democracy in
Argentina, Alfonsin must further open the policy-making
process to permit competitors to influence decisions.

This

is especially important with regard to economic policy
making.

The competitors are more likely to accept policy
5

decisions achieved through a process of mutual accomodation.
Institutionalizing competitive pluralism within the policy
making arena is essential to expanding the political system's
support.
Ironically, Alfonsin's goals of modernizing the country's
industrial base by attracting foreign investment and by
turning public companies over to the private sector run up
against a general distrust of the state as a vehicle for
economic planning.

The tradition of using state authority for

narrow partisan purposes complicates effective management of
the nation's economy.

Gary W. Wynia perceptively argues that

the failure of past governments to overcome this widespread
mistrust was due to the apparent contradiction between:
The desire (of Argentina's presidents) to create
an independent state capable of arbitrating economic
conflicts, on the one hand, and a need to dictate
economic policies with highly partisan effects/ on
the other. ®
Alfonsin must work to end perceptions of the state
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as a purely partisan instrument.

Instead of simply adopting

the role of dedicated enforcer of unpopular policies,
Alfonsin must assume the more controversial role of arbitrator
between the conflicting classes and sectors in society.
Crucial to the success of Alfonsin*s chosen management
style is the creation of what Wynia terms:
Linkages between policy makers, administrators,
and the owners of land, labor, and capital that
will enable the first two to lead the last in the
pursuit of societal goals. *7
The continued failure of Argentine leaders to win the
cooperation of the private sector in the implementation
of their economic programs reflected structures which
inhibited dialogue between policymakers and their
constituents.
Alfonsin is making progress in his relations
with agricultural and business groups.

According to one

prominent businessman, "Every four months or so we go to see
Alfonsin . . . he is very pluralistic.

This is how he has
8
gained the good will of so many of us." These efforts to
foster good relations between the country's entrepreneurs and

public officials may expand the government's capacity to
achieve its policy objectives.

Yet, this dialogue must

extend beyond mere personal relationships to allow structural
access to decisionmakers.
Alfonsin's administration also needs the support of
organized labor; this will be a major challenge.

With the

death of Juan Peron on July 1, 1974, and the self-^xile of
the third Mrs. Per^n on July 6, 1981, the Peronist Party
lacked leadership to mediate between its many factions.
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The union leaders assumed de facto leadership positions
of the Peronist Party following the 1983 primary elections.
Despite losing the gubernatorial race, Herminio Iglesias,
a trade union politician, controls the Peronist vote in
the Buenos Aires province.

Lorenzo Miguel, head of the

powerful metalworkers union and chief of the "62
Organizations," the political arm of the General Confederation
of Labor, won internal elections to become party first vice
president. The title, however, is misleading.

He runs the

party in the absence of Isabel Per^n, who remains the party's
9
elected president.
In his initial relations with the union structure,
Alfonsin set out to limit the autonomy of the powerful
labor hierarchy.

As he stated in one interview,

"Without

democracy in the unions there cannot be democracy in the
lO
country."
Alfonsm's bill to democratize the unions required
court-controlled elections of union officers and
representation of the losing factions on union boards.
In reaction to the proposed legislation, the Peronistdominated Senate rallied in March 1984 to defeat the bill.
Three independent ballots supported the Peronists,
demonstrating the continuing strength of the union bosses.
This failure convinced Alfonsfn to adopt a more
conciliatory approach. In April 1984, he dismissed Labor
Minister Antonio Mucci, who had antagonized unionists by
intervening in the affairs of two major unions.

Opting for
n
negotiation rather than confrontation, Alfonsin renewed his
calls for national unity.

"Without reconciliation and
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dialogue,” he cautioned Congress, "the tendencies to
11

fragmentation could appear and grow."

While the Peronist bureaucracy within the labor movement
will try to maintain its position by pummeling the
government with extravagant economic demands, Alfonsin must
work to keep this sector at the bargaining table.

Yet, in

view of the strong Peronist loyalties and the unpredictable
economic conditions in Argentina, Alfonsin will have great
difficulty in accomplishing this task.

Nevertheless, it is

essential that government authorities establish an acceptable
forum for dialogue with the labor movement.

To promote such a

dialogue, Alfonsin*s government has currently called together
employers, political and union representatives, and
specialists to discuss a new system of labor relations.

The

government plans to submit the conclusions of this discussion
to Congress so it can determine the scope and the final
12
content of the reform.
By excluding their political adversaries from
the decision-making process, past governments succeeded only
in provoking the kind of disobedience that threatened policy
implementation and undermined nation cohesion. By setting up
and maintaining a more complex "environment of choice," in
which economic problems can be identified, alternative courses
of action evaluated, and appropriate measures implemented in
an open manner, Alfonsin will be better able to manage the
13
strains which inevitably accompany economic fluctuations.
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AUTONOMY
During his first two years in office, Alfonsin has
responded quickly and decisively to challenges to the fragile
democratic order.

As New York Times correspondent Lydia

Chavez points outs
Many times during his first two years Mr.
Alfonsin*s dreams have confronted an
inhospitable reality. At times his
response has been belated, confused or
even reactionary, reaching back to the
legal traditions of despots. It has
never been weak. 14
In response to public outrage following the humiliating
defeat in the South Atlantic War and revelations of military
atrocities committed during Argentina's internal "dirty war"
against urban guerrillas, Alfonsin purged the top ranks of the
armed forces.

Less than one month after taking office, he

removed one-half of the Army generals.
elements of the Air Force and the Navy.

Similarly, he retired
In the subsequent

budget-cutting process, he reduced military expenditures from
6 percent of the gross national product to less than 4
percent.

He terminated the armed forces' 50-year control

over Fabricaciones Militares,

("a military-industrial

complex that produces everything from plowshares to bullets
and has been a nexus for coup-prone industrial and union
15
leaders").
In contrast to previous civilian administrations,
Alfonsin's government prosecuted the military elites for
spreading "terror, pain and death throughout Argentine
16
society."
True to an election pledge, Alfonsin voided an
amnesty law granting armed forces personnel immunity from
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punishment for acts committed during the "dirty war."

The

government then put on trial for mass murder nine prominent
members of the first three military juntas which ruled after
1976.

The government also arrested retired Army chief and

former president, General Leopoldo Galtieri, along with the
chiefs of the other two services, for their roles in the South
Atlantic War.
Human rights groups complained that the government was not
doing enough to bring the armed forces to justice. By the
summer of 1984, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and
other groups, including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
and the Center for Legal and Social Studies, had filed over 50
individual cases against military men in relation to
17
disappearances which occurred during the "dirty war."

In

pressing their cause, Luis Lorenzano and Alejandro Dabat of
the Argentine Human Rights Coordinating Committee argue:
Since no serious attempt will be made to uproot
the terrorist structures within the top and middle
echelons of the three armed forces, a crucial role
will be played by the human rights organizations
and the working-class and popular movement. However
much it may be accused of destabilizing the situation,
the latter will have to stick to its demands and go
well beyond the actions of the government.
Although Alfonsin was a human rights advocate during
the days of repression, as President, he and his advisors
must worry that extended court inquiries into individual
officer's responsibility could undermine the military as an
institution.

By allowing the military courts to handle these

cases, the government argues that the possibility 6f a
civilian-led witch hunt is checked.

Moreover, Alfonsin's

military reforms have removed civilians from the jurisdiction
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of military tribunals and have made armed forces personnel
19
liable for prosecution in civilian courts for common crimes.
Alfonsin's position reflects
popular demands while protecting

the dilemma of responding to
the autonomy of institutions.

As he points outs
We have to realize that to make the country we
want, we have to count on the military . . . What
we have to put an end to are
the differences
that
make no sense* 20
When the public trials of the nine former military rulers
ended in October 1985, Buenos Aires became the site of
numerous bomb threats and explosions.

President Alfonsxn

promptly arrested six officers and six civilians.

When legal

complications threatened to thwart the president's actions,
he declared a state of siege to keep the suspects in
custody.

His forceful action effectively eliminated the

frequent bombing incidents.
Nevertheless, an ailing economy threatens the government's
efforts at national reconciliation.

Since 1960 Argentina has

had only two years of less than double-digit inflation.

The

idea that runaway inflation can coexist with prosperity and
political stability is a carry over from the first Peronist
administration.

The notion that governments can stimulate

expansion by spending has resulted in inefficient investment
and huge inflation-producing government deficits.

High rates

of inflation indicate a breakdown of effective government.
As Robert J. Samuelson puts it, "Instead of making choices,
21
/
the government prints money."
f
As his first step against inflation, Alfonsin announced
on June 14, 1885, a wage-price freeze that is to stay in
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effect until society and its institutions are convinced that
inflation will not return.

In addition, he promised to
22

limit monetary expansion and to cut the federal deficit.
The government's economic reforms also called for a reduced
role of the state in industry.

In direct opposition to some

in his own party, Alfonsin argues that such steps are
necessary because the private sector is more efficient than
the state in handling most forms of enterprise.

The Alfonsin

government, by holding down inflation and reducing the role of
the state in the economy, hopes to restore investment and
promote economic growth.
Alfonsin initially succeeded in gaining broad public
support for his economic policies. But the unions resisted.
Real wages declined over 30 percent, and the labor movement
attacked what it considered the government's lack of attention
23
to social welfare concerns.
Although the powerful union
leaders criticized Alfonsin's program, demonstrable progress
was being made. Inflation fell to about 2 percent a month at
the close of 1985, prompting favorable predictions for the
current year.

The traditional Peronist leaders received

little popular support in the 1985 by-elections.
Under Alfonsin's direction, the government has managed to
mobilize popular support behind military reforms and neo
orthodox development policies.

Through consensus-building

measures, Alfonsin has "tamed" the aspirations of many
24
Argentines.
His drive for the decentralization of political,
economic, and social power has helped to restore much needed
autonomy to national political institutions.
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LEGITIMACY
Argentina's chronic political instability is in part a
product of recurring crises of legitimacy.

These crises

took place as groups in power pursued their own interests with
little regard for the interests of the nation.

As

participation expanded, Argentine political conflict polarized
around two opposing sets of interests —
populist.

conservative and

The classically liberal forces of traditionalism

faced a challenge from the populist forces represented by
Yrigoyen's Radicals and the Peronists.

With increases in

participation, the pendulum of power shifted toward the
populists; with the rising exclusiveness of the regimes that
followed, however, the pendulum swung back toward the
conservatives.
Robert A. Dahl's typology classifying participation and
public competition as independent dimensions of political
conflict is useful for understanding Argentina's political
25
dilemma.
In Argentine politics, these two dimensions tended
to exist independently of each other, not only historically,
but also as beliefs.
In power, the Radicals and the Peronists after them
attempted to alter the rules of the political game by
emphasizing increased participation at the expense of
opportunities for effective opposition.

During the latter

half of the 1920s, the Radicals benefitted greatly from the
/

increase in the middle class around the turn of th£ century.
The Peronists similarly maintained their grip on power by
mobilizing the support of the newly-enfranchised working
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class.

As participation levels peaked during both periods of

populist rule, political oppositions were increasingly
suppressed.
Alfonsin's interest in further liberalizing the political
system necessarily entails the creation of an arrangement
which balances mass participation with opportunities for
effective opposition.

The task is to convince Peronists and

anti-Peronists alike to abide by the rules and to work
through the institutions of political democracy.

The

acceptance of free and fair elections as a basic norm in
Argentine politics is a necessary first step toward increased
stability.
One useful way of determining the legitimacy of the new
system is to observe the succession process.

As elections

approach, Alfonsin too must demonstrate his willingness to
abide by their results.

This is a particularly critical step

toward institutionalizing the system of government, since:
. • • individuals within the system are forced to
decide whether their loyalties are confined to
those who, up to that point, have exercised
authority or to the system of government itself. °
The results of the November 1985 off-year elections indicated
that a new political outlook is gaining acceptance in
Argentina.

Although Alfonsin polled favorable ratings of

73 percent, his Radical Party won only 43 percent of the vote
in the elections.
have

In the past, such a popular leader would

insured his party a sweep.

points out:

However, as Lydia Chavez
7

.
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• . • Argentines showed restraint. They rejected
making Mr. Alfonsin the leader of a new movement,
as many had predicted, and insteacLspread their
votes among the different parties. '
A test of the system will take place when Alfonsin
must transfer power to another leader.

This problem of

transferring leadership from one individual to another is
especially acute in Argentine politics where charisma plays
such an important role.

The attention given by Alfonsin to

the institutionalization of his administration may be the most
important factor in determining the legitimacy of democratic
government in Argentina.
II.

Conclusion
A sign of maturity in modernizing states is the

institutionalization of political organizations based on
consensual political norms.

In Argentina's development,

crises of participation have led to the decay of traditional
rules and institutions.

In the ensuing polarization, two

broad political factions, each unwilling to share power and
reach decisions by consultation and compromise, have produced
political turmoil.
Alfonsin's reformist alternative offers a potential
synthesis of these two extreme approaches to governing.
By offering opportunities for both participation as well as
effective opposition, Alfonsin may lay the basis for a lasting
democratic political order.

With the institutionalization of

adaptable, complex, autonomous, and legitimate structures
and procedures, Argentina will be better able to escape its
type casting as victim of a recurring war between competing

political factions for a new role in shaping its own destiny.
The challenge for President Alfonsin is to use his
personal popularity to foster the institutionalization of a
more open political system.

This means that he must work to

overcome the problem of transferring authority from
charismatic to non-charismatic leaders.

In effect, Alfonsin
28
must learn how to "exercise power without charisma."
Future stability in Argentina hinges on the establishment
of accepted procedures for the transfer of power within the
governing system.
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CONCLUSION

Samuel Huntington argues that, when traditional political
institutions are weak in modernizing countries, authority
1
frequently passes to charismatic leaders. Historical
circumstances place these individuals in a unique position
to pursue institutional development.

A conflict often arises

between the interests of the individual leader and the
interests of institutions.

As Huntington puts it:

"The

would-be institution-builder needs personal power to create
institutions but he cannot create institutions without
2
relinquishing personal power."
The weakness of political institutions under Yrigoyen
and Peron demonstrated the limits of popular mass movements.
These anti-status-quo movements were loosely organized, lacked
coherent ideologies, and relied primarily on the political
skills of their leaders and the enthusiasm of the mobilized
masses. The personalism which dominated both movements
ultimately permeated and debilitated government structures.
The contribution of these movements to Argentine politics
was therefore self-limiting.

As Jacques Lambert points out

with characteristic hyperbole:

both Radicalism and Peronism,
,

"destroyed a great deal but did not rebuild anythihg."

3

Nevertheless, they broke the rural Conservatives' monopoly
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on public office and forced their compatriots to reconsider
the practices of the traditional political game.
As a mass movement, Radicalism was akin to a moral
crusade seeking the spiritual rebirth of Argentine society.
U.C.R. partisans addressed one another as spiritual
bretheren, termed the movement "the cause," and viewed
4
Yrigoyen as their spiritual leader. Beneath this exterior,
however, the U.C.R. was a system of local party bosses and
their machine organizations.

The lack of unity between

Yrigoyen's populist line and the personalism inherent in
the operation of government culminated in instability.
Peronist populism, which glorified the native creole
culture and proclaimed the dignity of the common worker,
provided a ready vehicle for the political integration of
the Argentine masses.

Denouncing the evils of personalism,

Peron set out to organize a broad-based political party.
Yet, the organization he created was completely
personalistic, and this quality eventually blocked the
transformation of the Peronist movement into an effective
political party.
During both periods political instability was positively
associated with:

electoral strategies based on populistic

appeals to the masses, the informal and personalistic
character of the state, and the lack of widespread acceptance
of a single set of political rules. Opposition mounted when
both the Radicals and the Peronists demonstrated that they had
no intention of sharing power or reaching decisions through
consensus measures.
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The Radicals and Peronists violated the traditional
rules of the political game.

The legitimacy crises that

arose in 1930 and again in 1955, resulted in the political
5
restoration of traditional elites. The failure of these
populist movements to institutionalize enduring political
structures permitted the reemergence of traditional rules and
practices.

The Peronist/anti-Peronist conflict, like the

Radical-Conservative conflict which preceded it, reflected
the ongoing debate between populist attitudes and traditional
6
institutions.
The current popular support for the Radicals marks the
latest chapter in Argentina's political drama.

Raul

Alfonsin, the standard-bearer of Yrigoyen's Radicals,
must contend with a highly differentiated but poorly
integrated political system.

The Alfonsin administration

must finish the job left behind by the two previous populist
regimes.

That is, Alfonsin must shape institutions that

reflect the changes in norms and values brought about by
Argentina's rapid modernization.
As the experiences of the Radical and Peronist periods
suggest, the conjunction of high political participation and
low institutionalization seems to increase the inclination of
of disaffected elite groups to resort to attempts at
“irregular" government change, or coups.

Alfonsin must

take steps to ensure that his government does not follow
this pattern.

The lesson for Alfonsin:

the existence of

strong and well-developed civilian socio-political
institutions diminishes the frequency of coups.

105.

The process of political institutionalization offers a
method for coping with mass demands for greater social,
economic, or political equality and with traditional concerns
for political order.

A necessary step in this direction would

include the full incorporation of the Peronists into the
decision-making process. In this way, Alfonsin may begin to
increase the adaptability and complexity of the Argentine
political system.

Alfonsin must use his personal prestige and

the power of his office to mobilize consent behind pluralistic
political institutions without detracting from their autonomy.
In sum, Alfonsin must overcome the division of society by
closed political or sectional interests dedicated to pursuing
their own exclusive goals.
This study points out that political decay —
atrophy of political institutions —

or the

was a major cause of

Argentina's instability during the two periods reviewed.
As both Yrigoyen and Peron pursued their personalist
strategies to retain power, they inhibited the growth of
strong political institutions.

Alfonsin must acknowledge the

major lesson of Argentina's political experience:

a

charismatic leader may successfully retain wide popular
support while failing to take steps to institutionalize the
political system.

The fundamental task before Alfonsin is

therefore to strengthen the legitimacy of Argentine democracy
by demonstrating the viability of its political institutions.
RaiSl Alfonsin has more than three years left ih office.
If he survives, it will mark the first time that a civilian
Argentine president has completed a full term since Juan
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Peron was reelected in 1952.

That, in itself, will be a

major contribution to the institutionalization of Argentine
democracy.

But the larger task remains:

Alfonsin must

convince Argentines that a working democratic order will
continue to be an illusory goal until the people and the
elites accept the need to strengthen the political system's
ability to accomodate change.
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